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Venue Under the Antitrust Laws: Amenability of
Parent Corporations to Suit by Virtue of Their
Subsidiarys' Activities
The courts have developed two tests for determining the pro-
per judicial districts in which corporate defendants in antitrust
suits may be sued under section 12 of the Clayton Act. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit applied
the less restrictive test in holding that the parent corporation was
"transacting business" in the local district through the activities
of its subsidiary. The author agrees with the court's application
of a totality-of-circumstances analysis in finding that venue was
proper but criticizes the court for not having taken the opportun-
ity to inter the more restrictive test.
Tiger Trash, a division of Joe W. Morgan, Inc., was engaged in
the solid refuse collection service business. It initiated an antitrust
action against Browning-Ferris Industries of Indiana, Inc. ("BFI-
Indiana") and its parent corporation, Browning-Ferris Industries,
Inc. ("BFI") of Houston, Texas. Tiger Trash alleged that the cor-
porate defendants had engaged in an attempt to monopolize the
refuse collection market in violation of section 2 of the Sherman
Act.) BFI filed a motion to dismiss2 on the ground that the district
court lacked personal jurisdiction over BFI since it was not amen-
able to suit in that forum under the venue provision of the antitrust
laws.' The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Indiana granted defendant BFI's motion to dismiss. The district
1. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). Plaintiff Tiger Trash also alleged that defendants had violated
similar provisions of the Indiana Antitrust Act. IND. CODE §§ 24-1-2-2, -7 (1976). The
fourth count of the complaint charged BFI with violating § 7 of the Clayton Act. 15 U.S.C. §
18 (1976).
2. In the same motion, defendant BFI also challenged the in personam jurisdiction of
the district court under the Indiana pendent "long-arm" statute, the Indiana Antitrust Act,
claiming that it had not supplied or contracted to supply services of any kind in the state.
Defendant BFI-Indiana, in addition to denying the material allegations of plaintiff's
complaint and filing counterclaims thereto, moved for summary judgment on alternative
grounds. First, BFI-Indiana contended that plaintiff had failed to define properly the relevant
service market. Second, summary judgment was proper since there was no dangerous proba-
bility that the alleged attempt to monopolize could be successful. BFI-Indiana added that
any alleged attempt to monopolize would have no appreciable effect on interstate commerce.
3. Clayton Act § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1976) (originally enacted ch. 323, § 12, 38 Stat. 736
(1914)). This statute provides as follows:
Any suit, action, or proceeding under the antitrust laws against a corporation may
be brought not only in the judicial district whereof it is an inhabitant, but also
in any district wherein it may be found or transacts business; and all process in
such cases may be served in the district of which it is an inhabitant, or wherever
it may be found.
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court held that since BFI had not transacted business in the South-
ern District of Indiana, venue in that judicial district was improper.
BFI, the parent corporation of BFI-Indiana, would not be deemed
to have transacted business by virtue of its subsidiary's activities
because the parent had not consciously exercised control over the
subsidiary's day-to-day operations. On appeal, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, held, reversed and re-
manded: Parent corporations are amenable to antitrust suits in ju-
dicial districts in which subsidiary corporations transact business
where the parent-subsidiary relationship consists of something
more than mere investment holding by the parent.' Tiger Trash v.
Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc., 560 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978).
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Tiger Trash is the most recent
chapter in the erratic judicial construction of section 12 of the Clay-
ton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1976). That statute prescribes the judicial
districts in which corporate defendants in antitrust suits may be
sued. Numerous decisions under section 12 evidence the application
of two tests for determining when a parent corporation will be
deemed to have transacted business in a judicial district and when
it will be amenable to suit in a particular district by virtue of the
actions of its wholly or partially owned subsidiary. The more restric-
tive test5 requires that for a parent corporation to be sued in a
judicial district in which its subsidiary transacts business, the par-
ent must consciously exercise control over the subsidiary's day-to-
day operations.' The less restrictive test7 would permit a parent
4. The court of appeals also reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for
defendant BFI-Indiana for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Two broad tests have developed for determining subject matter jurisdiction over a sub-
stantive Sherman Act claim. They are (1) the "in commerce" test (whether the relevant
product market upon which the substantive claims have infringed are geographically inter-
state), and (2) the "affecting commerce" test (whether the activity has a substantial and
adverse effect on interstate commerce though the relevant product market is not interstate
in its geographic aspect). The court found that subject matter jurisdiction existed under
either of the two tests developed to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction over a
substantive Sherman Act claim exists. 560 F.2d 818, 824-27 (7th Cir. 1977). See generally
Ferguson, The Commerce Test for Jurisdiction Under the Sherman Act, 12 Hous. L. Rv.
1052 (1975); 36 LA. L. REV. 1040 (1976); 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 323 (1974); 21 ViL. L. Rav. 721
(1976); 33 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 181 (1976).
5. This test was first stated in Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333
(1925).
6. San Antonio Tel. Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 499 F.2d 349 (5th Cir. 1974)
(interconnected communications network of 22 companies coupled with division among com-
panies of revenue obtained from long distance communication held insufficient); O.S.C.
Corp. v. Toshiba America, Inc., 491 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1974) (Japanese corporation sold its
products to wholly owned subsidiary in Japan which in turn delivered products in United
States, the court finding the corporate separation here to be real as they had in Cannon);
[Vol. 33:271
VENUE UNDER THE ANTITRUST LAWS
corporation to be sued in a judicial district in which its subsidiary
transacts business where the parent has the ability to control the
subsidiary's policy decisions which might result in antitrust viola-
tions.' In reversing the district court's dismissal, the Court of Ap-
Aro Mfg. Co. v. Automobile Body Research Corp., 352 F.2d 400, 404 (lst Cir. 1965) (defen-
dant, Maryland corporation whose only business was to assign patents and collect royalties
from Massachusetts corporation, as assignee of patent and considered to be doing business,
would not be dispositive of finding Maryland corporation doing or transacting business in
Massachusetts); Williams v. Cannon, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 376, 379 (C.D. Cal. 1977) (use of
parent's trademarks (Japanese corporation) by subsidiary, parent's licensing agreements and
joint venture with United States companies, sales of parent's securities in the United States
and Central District of California, operation of training school run by parent's factory em-
ployees in district, and allegation that basic decisions emanate from Japan were insufficient
to show control necessary to be considered transacting business in district); In re Chicken
Antitrust Litigation, 407 F. Supp. 1285, 1297 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (wholly ownedsubsidiary with
common officers and/or directors of the parent held insufficient); Martin-Trigona v. Banka-
merica Corp., 1974-1 Trade Cases 74,916, at 96,113 (D.D.C. 1974) (wholly owned subsidiary
acting as agent but not engaged in commercial activity held insufficient; wholly owned
subsidiary not under day-to-day control held insufficient); Hayashi v. Sunshine Garden
Prod., Inc., 285 F. Supp. 632, 634 (W.D. Wash. 1967) (mere fact that wholly owned subsidiary
had some common officers with parent was insufficient in absence of showing that foreign
corporation in fact controlled and managed subsidiary), aff'd, 396 F.2d 13 (9th Cir. 1968);
Global Pub. Corp. v. Grolier, Inc., 273 F. Supp. 637 (D. Mass. 1967) (plaintiff failed to show
that parent substantially dominated and controlled subsidiaries and failed to show that
subsidiaries were agents, dummies or alter egos of parent); Zwingle v. Tyson's Foods, Inc.,
241 F. Supp. 940, 943 (W.D. Okla. 1965) (a wholly owned subsidiary had common directors,
purchased products from other subsidiary of parent and parent's prospectus for public offer-
ing reported activities of all wholly owned subsidiaries and profits with approval of subsidi-
ary's directors-held insufficient); Fisher Baking Co. v. Continental Baking Corp., 238 F.
Supp. 322, 323 (D. Utah 1965) (relying on Cannon, the court held that interlocking directo-
rates or officers do not destroy the separation between parent and subsidiary); Intermountain
Ford Tractor Sales Co. v. Massey-Ferguson Ltd., 210 F. Supp. 930 (D. Utah 1962)(direct
shipment of equipment by parent to retailers and customers of subsidiary at subsidiary's
direction was held insufficient where goods were sold to subsidiary prior to shipment but the
court found that the identities of the two corporations could not be separated and the parent
was amenable to suit), aff'd, 325 F.2d 713 (10th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 931 (1964);
Terry Carpenter, Ltd. v. Ideal Cement Co., 117 F. Supp. 441 (D. Neb. 1954) (wholly owned
subsidiary's cement plant with considerable overlapping of personnel held to be insufficient).
A similar test for venue has been applied to suits brought under the securities laws. See
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Gulf & Western Indus., Inc., 309 F. Supp. 75, 78 (E.D. Wis.
1970).
7. This test was derived from Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273
U.S. 359 (1927). See United States v. Scophony Corp. of America, 333 U. S. 795 (1948).
8. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 402 F. Supp. 262, 317-28 (E.D.
Pa. 1975) (judge discussed the cases described below and concluded that the subsidiaries had
sufficient intimacy with parent to subject parent to suit in local district); Hitt v. Nissan
Motor Co., 399 F. Supp. 838, 843 (S.D. Fla. 1975) (sphere of control exercisable over wholly
owned subsidiary by parent, the exchange of officers and employees and the common direc-
tors during jurisdictional period were sufficient to find the parent "transacting business"
within forum under § 12 of the Clayton Act); Call Carl, Inc. v. BP Oil Corp., 391 F. Supp.
367, 372 (D. Md. 1975) (where parent controlls marketing decisions of its subsidiary and
views the subsidiary as its marketing arm on the East Coast and parent "controls, markets,
and disposes of [subsidiary's] assets as if they were its own," these activities sufficient in
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peals for the Seventh Circuit failed to identify this split in author-
ity. On the contrary, the court cited cases employing both the more
and less restrictive tests without characterizing them as such.' On
balance, however, the court's analysis led it to a conclusion consis-
tent with the policy underlying section 12 of the Clayton Act, 0
thereby permitting Tiger Trash to maintain its antitrust action in
a more convenient and less costly forum.
Plaintiffs maintaining private antitrust actions must initially
concern themselves with the selection of an appropriate forum.
Selection of the appropriate court entails an examination of the
defendant's contacts with and activities in a judicial district. This
examination enables the plaintiff to decide whether the court cho-
sen will have jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and
whether the location of the court selected is proper for the suit to
be heard. The latter question, whether venue is proper, has special
significance in antitrust cases. Oftentimes, the antitrust plaintiff is
in a far weaker financial position than the defendant. If the plaintiff
must pursue his remedy in a distant forum, that being the only
applying the Scophony test); Audio Warehouse Sales, Inc. v. United States Pioneer Elec.
Corp., 1975-1 Trade Cases 60,213, at 68,382 (D.D.C. 1975) (rejected the Cannon test and
applied the totality-of-circumstances test where employees shifted between parent and sub-
sidiary, directors and officers overlapped, the subsidiary received preferential treatment un-
like other corporate entities that dealt with parent, the subsidiary had exclusive use of
parent's trademarks and subsidiary operated as marketing arm for parent in the United
States); Dobbins v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 362 F. Supp. 54 (D. Ore. 1973) (parent
ignored formal corporate division between it and its subsidiary, becoming directly involved
in subsidiary's operations and policy decisions); Luria Steel & Trading Corp. v. Ogden Corp.,
327 F. Supp. 1345 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (10 of 28 officers or directors of parent corporation served
as officers or directors of the subsidiaries and various types of actions were to be reported to
the parent by its subsidiary prior to the taking or approving of such action); Flank Oil Co. v.
Continental Oil Co., 277 F. Supp. 357 (D. Colo. 1967) (parent of wholly owned subsidiary
which maintained contact through directors and investment advisor committee, both capable
of profoundly influencing subsidiary, and which had power to determine such policy questions
as product prices, exploration, research and selling and advertising prices was amenable to
process); Waldron v. British Petroleum Co., 149 F. Supp. 830 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (the fact that
wholly owned subsidiaries performed services in local jurisdiction ordinarily performed by
service employees and made sales ordinarily made by sales department was sufficient for
finding parent transacting business within local district); cf. City of Philadelphia v. Morton
Salt Co., 289 F. Supp. 723, 725 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (defendant, a foreign corporation held to be
transacting business in forum state by virtue of its carrying on a continuous and direct course
of business in the forum district as well as its relationship to resident corporation which
distributed its products).
One court's analysis of the venue question must be characterized as inconsistent; the
court employed a day-to-day control test but specifically emphasized the ability of the parent
to influence major decisions of the subsidiary which might lead to antitrust violations. Grap-
pone, Inc. v. Subaru of America, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 123, 131 (D.N.H. 1975).
9. See cases discussed in Annot., 3 A.L.R. Fed. 120, § 9 (1970).
10. The underlying policy of § 12 of the Clayton Act is to liberalize the restrictive venue
provision of the Sherman Act. See note 11 infra.
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appropriate venue, an otherwise meritorious action may be aban-
doned.
Under the original venue provision of the Sherman Act, defen-
dants in antitrust actions could only be sued in judicial districts
wherein they resided or could be found." This provision proved
objectionable, impeding enforcement of the Sherman Act by per-
mitting alleged violators to use the venue requirement as a sword
and to escape unscathed; 2 judicial construction of this statute often
made it impossible for plaintiffs to institute and maintain an action
in a convenient forum."' Congress, in an attempt to ameliorate this
condition, enacted broad venue provisions to replace the relatively
restrictive ones of the Sherman Act. 4
The broader venue provision of the Clayton Act permits corpo-
rate defendants to be sued in any judicial district wherein they are
an inhabitant, may be found or transact business. 5 This statute was
designed to make it more convenient for plaintiffs to bring suits and
conduct trials, 1 thereby removing the often insuperable obstacle
created by the original venue provision of the Sherman Act."'
The statutory phrase most pregnant with meaning is "transacts
business."' 8 It is under this rubric that parent corporations have
found themselves amenable to suits" in judicial districts in which
11. Section 7 of the Sherman Act, the original venue provision for antitrust actions,
provided as follows:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by any other
person or corporation by reason of anything forbidden or declared to be unlawful
by this act, may sue therefor in any circuit court of the United States in the
district in which the defendant resides or is found, without respect to the amount
in controversy, and shall recover three fold the damages by him sustained, aid
the costs of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat. 209, 210 (1890) (repealed 1914) (emphasis added).
12. 1962 WASH. U. L.Q. 261.
13. See United States v. Scophony Corp. of America, 333 U.S. 795, 808 (1948); Note,
Venue in Private Antitrust Suits, 37 N.Y.U. L. R'v. 268, 270 (1962).
14. Pub. L. No. 63-212, § 12, 38 Stat. 738 (1914); See Note, supra note 13.
15. Clayton Act § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1976).
16. United States v. National City Lines, 334 U.S. 573, 581 (1948).
17. Id. See also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 374
(1927).
18. There is a split of authority on when the corporation must be transacting business
to come within the venue provision-at the time the cause of action arose or at the time the
suit is filed. See Eastland Constr. Co. v. Keasbey & Mattison Co., 358 F.2d 777, 779 & n.5
(9th Cir. 1966); Phillip Gall & Son v. Garcia Corp., 340 F. Supp. 1255, 1258 & n.2 (E.D. Ky.
1972); cases in Annot., 3 A.L.R. Fed. 120, § 6 (1970).
19. The general venue provisions are also applicable in determining whether a corpora-
tion is amenable to suit in a particular forum. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391-92 (1970). See Ballard v.
Blue Shield, Inc., 543 F.2d 1075, 1080 (4th Cir. 1976); Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v.
Kaplan, 429 F. Supp. 139, 141 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Shires v. Magnavox Co., 74 F.R.D. 373, 378
(E.D. Tenn. 1977); Fox-Keller, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 338 F. Supp. 813,
1978]
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the only business transacted is by their subsidiaries. The Supreme
Court of the United States has had two opportunities to construe
the "transacts business" language; therefore, those two cases,
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co.20 and United
States v. Scophony Corp. of America,' must be examined in detail.
In Eastman, plaintiff, a dealer in photographic materials and
supplies in Georgia, charged that defendant, a manufacturer of such
materials, had engaged in a combination to monopolize the inter-
state trade of photographic materials and supplies.2 The first ques-
tion addressed by the Court was whether the venue of the suit was
properly laid in the district court.23
The defendant corporation, Eastman Kodak, was a resident of
and had its principal place of business in New York. Although it had
sold and shipped photographic materials from New York to dealers
throughout Georgia, Kodak was not registered in Georgia as a non-
resident corporation for the purpose of doing business in that state,
nor did it have any office, place of business or resident agents in
Georgia. Kodak obtained its Georgia business through solicitation
of orders by traveling salesmen; orders were transmitted by the
salesmen to New York for acceptance or rejection. To promote de-
mand for its goods, Kodak also employed "demonstrators." These
demonstrators traveled throughout Georgia several times each year,
exhibiting and explaining the superiority of Eastman Kodak pro-
ducts to photographers and other users of photographic materials.
Although not soliciting orders for defendant's goods, demonstrators
did take retail orders from photographers which were turned over to
local dealers.24
The Court initially observed that under the old venue provision
of the Sherman Act25 the suit could not have been maintained in the
Georgia district because the defendant was not resident or found in
said district. Thereafter, the Court proceeded to find venue proper
under section 12 of the Clayton Act, concluding that the defendant
had transacted business in Georgia within the meaning of the new
venue provision." The Court remarked that the necessary effect of
section 12 was to enlarge the local jurisdiction of the district courts.
815 (E.D. Pa. 1972); 15 C. WiUGtfr, A. MiuLa & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTCE & PROCEDURE
§ 3818, at 109-10 (1976).
20. 273 U.S. 359 (1927).
21. 333 U.S. 795 (1948).
22. 273 U.S. at 368.
23. Id. at 370.
24. Id. at 370-71.
25. See note 11 supra.
26. 273 U.S. at 374.
[Vol. 33:271
VENUE UNDER THE ANTITRUST LAWS
"Transacts business" was defined in an "ordinary and usual" sense
to mean the transaction of business of any substantial character"
by a defendant corporation in the judicial district.28 With regard to
section 12, the Court found that:
[Tihis section supplements the remedial provision of the Anti-
Trust Act for the redress of injuries resulting from illegal re-
straints upon interstate trade, by relieving the injured person
from the necessity of resorting for the redress of wrongs commit-
ted by a non-resident corporation, to a district, however distant,
in which it resides or may be "found"-often an insuperable ob-
stacle-and enabling him to institute the suit in a district, fre-
quently that of his own residence, in which the corporation in fact
transacts business, and bring it before the court by service of
process in a district in which it resides or may be "found."'"
Twenty-one years later the Court would reaffirm this position in
United States v. Scophony Corp. of America.30
In Scophony, the Court was presented with the question of
whether the defendant, a British television equipment corporation
with its offices and principal place of business in London, England,
transacted business in the Southern District of New York, within
the meaning of section 12 of the Clayton Act, so that it could be sued
there for alleged violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act."
With the outbreak of World War II and the imposition of re-
strictions by the British government on the export of currency, Sco-
phony found itself in a financially weak position, unable to develop
the commercial sale of television equipment in England. After fail-
ing to exploit the American market on its own, Scophony looked to
commercial interests in the United States as a source of capital to
promote the utilization of its television patents and inventions. As
a means of achieving this goal, Scophony entered into an agreement
with several American motion picture and television interests. This
agreement provided for the formation of a Delaware corporation,
American Scophony. Scophony's capital stock ownership in the
American subsidiary enabled it to elect three of American Sco-
phony's five directors and its president, vice president, and treas-
urer. Under this agreement, Scophony also transferred to American
27. See cases discussed in Annot., 3 A.L.R. Fed. 120, § 5 (1970).
28. 273 U.S. at 372-73.
29. Id. at 373-74.
30. 333 U.S. 795 (1948).
31. Id. at 796. Plaintiff had alleged that Scophony and the other defendants had monop-
olized, attempted to monopolize, and conspired to restrain and monopolize iterstate and
foreign commerce in products, patents and inventions useful in television and related indus-
tries. Id. at 796-97.
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Scophony all of its equipment in the United States as well as all of
its patents and inventions.
The district court had previously granted defendant Sco-
phony's motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that venue
was improper under section 12 of the Clayton Act. In reversing the
district court's order of dismissal and remanding the matter for
further proceedings, the Court held that Scophony was amenable to
suit in the Southern District of New York because, in the ordinary
and usual sense, it had transacted business therein of a substantial
character. 2 Scophony's activities were characterized as a
"continuous course of business" in the Southern District of New
York "to salvage and resuscitate Scophony's whole enterprise from
the disasters brought upon it by the war."3
The Scophony Court reaffirmed the broad principles enunci-
ated in Eastman. In particular, highly technical distinctions pre-
viously engrafted upon the "found" or "carrying on business" test
of prior venue statutes were to be discarded." Instead, courts were
to view each case from a practical, commercial perspective in deter-
mining whether the corporate defendant had transacted business of
any substantial character in the judicial district in which plaintiff
had commenced the suit.35
Thus, by substituting practical, business conceptions for the
previous hair-splitting legal technicalities encrusted upon the
"found'-""present"-"carrying-on-business" sequence, the
Court yielded to and made effective Congress' remedial purpose.
Thereby it relieved persons injured through corporate violations
of the antitrust laws from the "often insuperable obstacle" of
resorting to distant forums for redress of wrongs done in the
places of their business or residence. A foreign corporation no
longer could come to a district, perpetrate there the injuries out-
lawed, and then by retreating or even without retreating to its
headquarters defeat or delay the retribution due."
32. Id. at 810.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 807.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 808 (footnote omitted). Defendant Scophony's argument, rejected by the
Court, was that its activities in New York were solely the creation and protection of an
investment and not the transaction of business. As authority for its position, Scophony relied
upon prior decisions interpreting "found" under the former antitrust venue provision, § 7,
and similar cases dealing with manufacturing and selling companies. One case cited by
defendant Scophony, Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333 (1925), was
subsequently employed by lower courts in fashioning a restrictive construction of the
"transacts business" provision of § 12. See notes 42-46 infra and accompanying text.
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Defendant Scophony had argued that its activities in New York
were merely the creation and protection of an investment and not
the transaction of business. The Court found this contention incon-
sistent with the nature of Scophony's relationship to its American
subsidiary. The contractual arrangements among the corporate
shareholders of American Scophony called for "continuing exercise
of supervision over and intervention in" the subsidiary's affairs." In
retrospect, this may be characterized as the genesis of the control
test. The Court found that a foreign parent corporation, Scophony,
transacted business within a judicial district and was amenable to
suit therein because of the control it was to have exercised over its
partially owned subsidiary, American Scophony. The erratic man-
ner in which the control test has developed is the center of the
discussion which follows.
It is generally agreed that mere ownership of stock in a subsidi-
ary corporation transacting business in a judicial district does not
make venue proper for antitrust suits against a parent corporation.3 1
The additional factor which must be present to make the parent
corporation amenable to suit is a control relationship over its sub-
sidiary. The concept of control is a shorthand method of determin-
ing whether the ownership of the subsidiary is a mere investment
or is an alternative means of transacting business by the parent
corporation. 9 If a subsidiary is merely another channel through
which a parent corporation does business, 0 it would be consistent
with the remedial purpose of the antitrust laws4' to subject the
corporate defendant to suit in a judicial district in which its subsidi-
ary transacts business. Many courts, however, have adopted a con-
trary view. Rather than examining the parent-subsidiary relation-
ship from a practical, commercial perspective, 2 several courts have
held that parent corporations do not transact business in a judicial
district by virtue of their subsidiaries' activities so long as the for-
mal corporate indentities of the two corporations are maintained.
The two corporations become one, in the view of these courts, only
when the parent consciously exercises control over the day-to-day
affairs of the subsidiary. Courts employing the "day-to-day" control
test 3 have usually sought support for their conclusions from a case
37. 333 U.S. at 814.
38. See, e.g., O.S.C. Corp. v. Toshiba America, Inc., 491 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1974).
39. See Hitt v. Nissan Motor Co., 399 F. Supp. 838, 841 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
40. City of Philadelphia v. Morton Salt Co., 289 F. Supp. 723, 725 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
41. See notes 16-17 supra and accompanying text.
42. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
43. See cases cited in note 6 supra.
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outside the antitrust area, Cannon Manufacturing Co. v. Cudahy
Packing Co."
In Cannon, the district court dismissed a diversity, breach of
contract action on the ground that the defendant, a foreign corpora-
tion, was not subject to the in personam jurisdiction of the court.
Plaintiff asserted that defendant, a Maine corporation, was doing
business within state of North Carolina because of the business
conducted by the defendant's wholly owned subsidiary. The Su-
preme Court of the United States affirmed the district court's dis-
missal. Although the Court admitted that the parent corporation
controlled the subsidiary to the same extent it controlled the depart-
ments or branches of its business not separately incorporated, the
formal corporate indentities were not to be ignored in determining
the existence of jurisdiction." Justice Brandeis, delivering the opin-
ion of the Court, reasoned that the corporate separation must have
been adopted to secure for the defendant-parent corporation some
advantage under local law, e.g., not subjecting itself to the jurisdic-
tion of local courts.46 Therefore, the Court was unwilling to go be-
yond the formal corporate separation, at least in the absence of a
congressional enactment making a corporation of one state amena-
ble to suit in a federal court in another state, in which the plaintiff
resides, where the foreign corporation employs a subsidiary corpora-
tion to transact business in the plaintiff's state.
The continuing vitality of Cannon as a precedent for determin-
ing the existence of in personam jurisdiction must be questioned 7
in light of the minimum contacts test enunciated by International
Shoe Co. v. Washington'" and recently expanded in Shaffer v.
Heitner. 1 At least one lower court, however, has found that Cannon
was untouched by International Shoe,0 and courts have continued
to rely upon Cannon for the proposition that a parent corporation
does not transact business in a judicial district within the meaning
44. 267 U.S. 333 (1925).
45. Id. at 335.
46. Id. at 336. The action had been removed by defendant from the state court in which
plaintiff had initiated the action. Id. at 334.
47. See Flank Oil Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 277 F. Supp. 357, 362-63 (D. Colo. 1967).
48. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
49. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
50. Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 364 F. Supp. 243, 248 n.3 (N.D. Tex. 1973).
The court's conclusion was drawn from a view that in Scophony (decided after International
Shoe), the Supreme Court had not modified the Cannon rule. The court recognized that the
acts of ownership and voting of majority stock might eventually lead to the sustaining of
jurisdiction over the nonresident corporation. The court, however, did not feel that it was in
a position to overrule or modify decisions of the Supreme Court. Cf. Call Carl, Inc. v. BP Oil
Corp., 391 F. Supp. 367, 373 (D. Md. 1975) (Scophony held to have laid Cannon to rest).
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of section 12 of the Clayton Act by virtue of its subsidiary's activities
unless it consciously exercises control over the .subsidiary's day-to-
day affairs." As suggested above,5" this approach appears inconsist-
ent with the remedial purpose underlying the enactment of section
12 of the Clayton Act. Several cases have specifically rejected the
day-to-day control approach enunciated in Cannon.3 One such case
is Flank Oil Co. v. Continental Oil Co. 54
In Flank Oil, the court described the Cannon decision as plac-
ing emphasis on formal matters such as separate charters, bylaws
and accounts, while discounting the importance of such factors as
the business or investment purpose of the parent in creating the
subsidiary." This approach was criticized as exalting form over sub-
stance" and as leading to virtual immunity from the antitrust laws,
especially where a large holding company withdraws from the con-
trol of the daily activities of its numerous subsidiaries.57 The court
in Flank Oil found that the more accurate guide was Scophony's
construction of section 12, a broader test for venue than the restric-
tive "presence" theory applied in Cannon's jurisdictional analysis.
Scophony teaches that the parent need not control day-to-day
activity of the subsidiary as a prerequisite to jurisdiction. Rather
the important test in that case appears to be whether the parent's
control is sufficient to influence and control those decisions which
might involve violation of the antitrust laws.58
51. See cases cited note 6 supra.
52. See text accompanying notes 38-44 supra.
53. Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of America, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 123, 131 (D.N.H. 1975);
Audio Warehouse Sales, Inc. v. United States Pioneer Elec. Corp., 1975-1 Trade Cases
60,213, at 65,832 (D.D.C. 1975); Hitt v. Nissan Motor Co., 399 F. Supp. 838, 843 (S.D. Fla.
1975); Call Carl, Inc. v. BP Oil Corp., 391 F. Supp. 367, 372 (D. Md. 1975), cert. denied, 98
S. Ct. 400 (1977); Flank Oil Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 277 F. Supp. 357, 361-65 (D. Colo.
1967).
54. 277 F. Supp. 357 (D. Colo. 1967).
55. Id. at 362.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 364.
58. Id. at 365. One lower court decision found that there are several factors that should
be examined in determining whether a corporation, though specifically absent from a judicial
district, is in fact transacting business there through a subsidiary corporation: (1) perform-
ance of business activities by the subsidiary that would be performed directly by the absent
corporation through branch offices or agents in a less elaborate corporate scheme; (2) partner-
ship in a worldwide business competition between the absent corporation and the corporation
that is present in the district; (3) the capacity of the absent corporation to influence decisions
of the subsidiary (bat might result in antitrust violations; (4) the part the subsidiary corpora-
tion plays in the overall business activity of the absent corporation; (5) the existence of an
integrated sales system involving manufacturing, trading and sales corporations; (6) the
status of the subsidiary as a marketing arm of the absent corporation; (7) the use by the
subsidiary of a trademark owned by the parent; (8) the transfer of personnel back and forth
between the parent and subsidiary corporations; (9) the presentation of a common marketing
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Several cases have followed Flank Oil in rejecting the day-to-day
control test set forth in Cannon."9 As suggested by one court, the
Cannon test has little validity and does not comport with the reme-
dial purpose of the antitrust laws in the present era of multinational
corporations and worldwide corporate empires.10
A corporation may be a fiction of the law but there is no
reason to carry the fiction to the extreme of saying that a corpora-
tion which has wholly owned subsidiaries performing services in
the local jurisdiction which ordinarily would be performed by
service employees, or making sales which ordinarily would be
made by a sales department, is in fact not transacting business
in that jurisdiction, particularly when the entire corporate set-up
of the defendant shows that it is designed to operate to a substan-
tial degree through separate corporate entities responding to the
wishes and directions of the parent and providing the revenues
sought by the parent. We would be exalting fiction over fact if we
were to conclude that under those circumstances the parent com-
pany was not in fact transacting business in this District through
the instrumentality of its wholly owned subsidiaries."
The Seventh Circuit's conclusion in Tiger Trash that BFI trans-
acted business in the Southern District of Indiana is consonant with
the less restrictive tests articulated by Flank Oil and those cases
rejecting Cannon. The only objection to the court's opinion in Tiger
Trash is that it fails to articulate sufficiently a generalized test for
"transacts business." The court was correct in performing a totality-
of-circumstances analysis;62 however, it never clearly identified the
image by the related corporations; and (10) the granting of an exclusive distributorship by
the absent corporation to its subsidiary. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.,
402 F. Supp. 262, 327-28 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
Each of these factors may also be deemed evidence of a purpose by the absent parent
corporation to employ the subsidiary as a means of transacting business in a particular
district. If this in fact is the purpose underlying the existing corporate arrangement, it should
follow that the parent corporation will also have the ability to control basic policy matters of
its subsidiary. Hence, each factor listed above can also be evidence of the ability to control
such decisions. The crucial point to remember is that the totality of circumstances in each
case is to be examined to determine if the subsidiary is transacting business "for the
parent."
59. See cases cited note 8 supra.
60. Audio Warehouse Sales, Inc. v. United States Pioneer Elec. Corp., 1975-1 Trade
Cases 60, 213, at 65,832 (D.D.C. 1975).
61. Waldron v. British Petroleum Co., 149 F. Supp. 830, 835 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
62. The court looked to many aspects of BFI-Indiana's relationship with BFI in conclud-
ing that venue was proper.
Development of the ability to provide a single source of reliable waste services
for companies with a number of geographically dispersed plants is an integral part
of BFI's corporate policy. BFI officers, some of whom are officers of BFI-Indiana,
assist the subsidiary through national marketing programs, signing up customers,
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one element that must be present to attribute the business activities
of a subsidiary corporation to its parent.
That element is a purpose on the part of the parent to transact
business through its subsidiary. The court hinted at such a test
when it agreed that a parent-subsidiary relationship consisting of
mere investment holding by the parent would not be sufficient to
bring it within section 12 of the Clayton Act.13 The court was also
correct in ascertaining that the degree of control exercised over a
subsidiary corporation by its parent is evidence of the parent's pur-
pose to conduct business through the subsidiary. Unfortunately, the
court did not see fit to give the Cannon line of cases the burial they
so justly deserve."4 The opportunity for interment was also rejected
by the Supreme Court. 5 One can only hope that Tiger Trash marks
a movement away from the restrictive venue test which frustrates
the remedial policies underlying the antitrust laws.
BRIAN F. SPECTOR
making basic market development decisions and assisting in supervising the sub-
sidiary by allocating financial resources, providing finances, systems accounting,
management supervision and examination and setting standards for return on
capital investment from the subsidiary. If a subsidiary's rate of return does not
meet BFI standards, BFI imposes corrective action. Also, BFI-Indiana licenses
and utilizes the parent's trade names without complying with [IND. CODE ANN. §
23-15-1-1] which requires registration of a trade name.
560 F.2d at 823.
63. 560 F.2d at 823.
64. See Call Carl, Inc. v. BP Oil Corp., 391 F. Supp. 367, 373 (D. Md. 1975). See also
United States v. Scophony Corp. of America, 333 U.S. 795, 812-13 & n.23, 814-18 (1948).
65. Defendant BFI's petition for certiorari was denied. 434 U.S. 1034 (1978).
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